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ABSTRACT
With the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT), establishing a
secure channel between smart devices becomes crucial. Recent re-
search proposes zero-interaction pairing (ZIP), which enables pairing
without user assistance by utilizing devices’ physical context (e.g.,
ambient audio) to obtain a shared secret key. The state-of-the-art
ZIP schemes suffer from three limitations: (1) prolonged pairing
time (i.e., minutes or hours), (2) vulnerability to brute-force offline
attacks on a shared key, and (3) susceptibility to attacks caused by
predictable context (e.g., replay attack) because they rely on limited
entropy of physical context to protect a shared key. We address
these limitations, proposing FastZIP , a novel ZIP scheme that signifi-
cantly reduces pairing time while preventing offline and predictable
context attacks. In particular, we adapt a recently introduced Fuzzy
Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (fPAKE) protocol and utilize
sensor fusion, maximizing their advantages. We instantiate FastZIP
for intra-car device pairing to demonstrate its feasibility and show
how the design of FastZIP can be adapted to other ZIP use cases.
We implement FastZIP and evaluate it by driving four cars for a
total of 800 km. We achieve up to three times shorter pairing time
compared to the state-of-the-art ZIP schemes while assuring robust
security with adversarial error rates below 0.5%.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Security services; • Computer sys-
tems organization→ Embedded and cyber-physical systems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of the Internet of Things (IoT) urges the need to
secure wireless communication between smart devices to protect
data they exchange (e.g., sensor readings). Such protection is crucial
to ensure user privacy and trustworthiness of IoT systems [17,
26, 27]. To secure wireless communication, unassociated devices
need to establish a shared secret key—a process known as secure
pairing. This shared key is used by devices to provide encryption
and authentication. In recent years, numerous pairing schemes
have been proposed, most of which rely on user assistance (e.g.,
entering a password) [8, 11, 30]. However, many IoT devices are
not equipped with user interfaces, making user-assisted pairing
impractical [17, 26]. In addition, a rapid increase in the number of
smart devices limits scalability of user-assisted schemes [13, 36].
To address this problem, recent research proposes zero-interaction
pairing (ZIP) utilizing devices’ context to derive a shared secret key
without user involvement [14, 17, 28, 37]. Such context is repre-
sented as a set of sensor modalities (e.g., audio, acceleration) col-
lected by devices from their ambient environment. ZIP schemes
utilize colocated devices residing in an enclosed physical space such
as a car to observe similar context compared to devices outside.
Specifically, the colocated devices record their context and translate
it to sequences of bits called fingerprints, which are input to a key
agreement protocol to establish a shared cryptographic key. Thus,
the security of ZIP schemes relies on the unpredictability of context,
which depends on the intensity and variety of ambient activity (e.g.,
sound, motion) occurring in the environment.
To date, a number of ZIP schemes utilizing various sensor modal-
ities to capture context have been proposed [17, 18, 27–29, 36, 37].
These state-of-the-art schemes have three major limitations: (1)
prolonged pairing time, (2) vulnerability to offline attacks, and (3)
susceptibility to attacks caused by predictable context (e.g., replay).
First, state-of-the-art ZIP schemes suffer from prolonged pairing
time requiring minutes and hours of context data to establish a
shared key [13, 17]. This happens because they use a cryptographic
primitive called fuzzy commitments [22], where the entropy of a
shared key is equal to the entropy of fingerprint bits, input to the
protocol. Thus, these ZIP schemes need to obtain at least 128 bits of
entropy from context to ensure that a shared key provides adequate
security [2]. Obtaining these bits takes a prolonged time because
many contexts change slowly. Second, state-of-the-art ZIP schemes
are by design vulnerable to offline attacks, namely an adversary can
mount a brute-force attack on a shared key by repeatably guessing
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Figure 1: Design space of FastZIP: it provides shorter pair-
ing time and improved security compared to state-of-the-art
ZIP schemes utilizing more common sensors.
attacks if they use (1) long fingerprints (i.e., >128 bits) of (2) high
entropy. However, recent works find severe entropy biases (e.g., bit
patterns) in fingerprints of state-of-the-art ZIP schemes [3, 13], ex-
posing them to offline attacks. Third, state-of-the-art ZIP schemes
are susceptible to context replay, inference, or monitoring attacks
due to predictable context [3, 13, 18]. Frequently, context becomes
predictable because it relies on a single sensormodality (e.g., acceler-
ation). Thus, an adversary can obtain similar context in comparable
environments, use better hardware, or employ video analysis.
The above three limitations impair practicality and security of
ZIP schemes, hindering their real-world deployment. To overcome
these limitations, we propose FastZIP , a novel ZIP scheme that
achieves shorter pairing time and improved security by addressing
the following two challenges. Figure 1 compares FastZIP and state-
of-the-art ZIP schemes in terms of paring time1, resistance to offline
attacks, and the number of common sensors required for pairing.
First, to shorten pairing time, we need to reduce the number of
fingerprint bits while being robust to offline attacks. This is challeng-
ing because fewer bits means less entropy in a shared key, easing
an offline attack. To address this challenge, we adapt a recently
introduced Fuzzy Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (fPAKE)
protocol [10]. fPAKE establishes a shared key from low-entropy se-
crets (e.g., short passwords) and is resistant to offline attacks. While
fPAKE is an existing protocol, adapting it to ZIP schemes is not
trivial. Specifically, we find that fPAKE protection against offline
attacks is not always guaranteed in realistic ZIP settings, namely
when colocated devices do not yield highly similar fingerprints
from context. Thus, we analyze how to set fPAKE parameters to
withstand offline attacks even in such settings (cf. Section 4). To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to implement fPAKE and
demonstrate that it shortens pairing time and improves security of
ZIP schemes using real-world data.
Second, to defend against predictable context attacks (e.g., replay
attacks), we propose a simple form of sensor fusion by concatenating
fingerprints derived from different sensors, each capturing distinct
ambient activity. Applying sensor fusion is not straightforward, as
1We use the shortest pairing time reported in the original publication for each scheme.
we require a generic method to extract fingerprint bits of sufficient
entropy from heterogeneous sensor signals (cf. Section 4). Existing
methods rely on scenario-specific characteristics of sensor signals
(e.g., peak occurence), thus cannot be directly reused, and they often
produce fingerprints with entropy biases [3, 13]. We demonstrate
that sensor fusion not only prevents predictable context attacks
(e.g., replay) but also assists fPAKE in shortening paring time, as
we obtain more bits from context, accumulating entropy faster.
Sensor fusion is feasible because smart devices have multiple sensor
modalities often integrated in one chip, for example, an inertial
measurement unit (IMU) contains an accelerometer, gyroscope, and
magnetometer [46], while a camera has light and RGB sensors, and
a wireless chipset hosts both Wi-Fi and Bluetooth [32].
We demonstrate the advantages of FastZIP by evaluating a novel
use case of intra-car device pairing (cf. Section 6), which is inspired
by the growing number of smart devices inside modern cars. For
example, the increasing popularity of carsharing and self-driving
rides urges the need to pair multiple user devices (e.g., smartphone,
earbuds) with infotainment systems of different cars to enable such
services as customized driving experience [19, 35]. Furthermore,
Electronic Control Units (ECUs) require pairing with wireless third-
party components (e.g., tire pressure monitor) to enable travel effi-
ciency and safety [7, 9, 43]. In both examples, the growing number
of devices hinder manual pairing, requiring pairing solutions with-
out user intervention. Despite focusing on in-car pairing, we show
how the design of FastZIP can generalize to other ZIP use cases
(e.g., smart home) to improve pairing time and security in Section 7.
Through our real-world experiments, we demonstrate the fea-
sibility of leveraging the context of a moving car to pair devices
inside it. Such context is affected by road and traffic conditions,
car characteristics such as suspension, and driving patterns, and it
can be captured by accelerometer, gyroscope, and barometer sen-
sors [6, 18, 34, 45] that are ubiquitous in user devices (e.g., smart-
phone) and modern cars. We evaluate FastZIP by collecting sensor
data from four cars driven over 800 km on different road types,
including urban, rural, and highways. In our evaluation, we assume
that pairing devices can start measuring context simultaneously by
receiving a broadcast command from the car’s infotainment system,
which is not compromised. FastZIP achieves up to three times faster
pairing compared to state-of-the-art ZIP schemes, shows error rates
below 0.5% in the presence of a powerful adversary, and runs ef-
ficiently on off-the-shelf IoT devices. In summary, we make the
following contributions:
• We design FastZIP , a novel ZIP scheme utilizing fPAKE and
sensor fusion to reduce pairing time and improve security.
• We implement FastZIP for intra-car device pairing and eval-
uate it by collecting real-world driving data, demonstrating
the effectiveness of FastZIP .
• We publicly release the collected data, source code of our
evaluation stack, and the first implementation of fPAKE.
2 BACKGROUND
We first explain the working principle and shortcomings of fuzzy
commitments—a cryptographic protocol used by state-of-the-art
ZIP schemes to share a secret key. Then, we detail the fPAKE proto-
col [10], addressing these shortcomings, that we utilize in FastZIP .
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ZIP Based on Fuzzy Commitments. Prior work on ZIP relies on
fuzzy commitments or vaults [21, 22] to exchange a key 𝐾 between
two devices holding similar fingerprints 𝑓 , 𝑓 ′ [17, 18, 27–29, 36, 37].
Specifically, Device A chooses a 128-bit key 𝐾 and sends a com-
mitment 𝑐 ← ECC.Encode(𝐾) ⊕ 𝑓 to Device B, which can recover
𝐾 ← ECC.Decode(c ⊕ f′) if the fingerprint mismatch 𝑓 ′ ⊕ 𝑓 is
within the error correction capability of the error correction code
(ECC). While conceptually simple, this approach has two disadvan-
tages in the case of ZIP. First, it inherently requires fingerprints
𝑓 , 𝑓 ′ to be at least 140 bits, since they are XORed to an expanded en-
coding of the 128-bit key2. Second, an eavesdropping adversary can
capture the commitment 𝑐 and try decoding it with arbitrarily many
fingerprint guesses to obtain the key 𝐾 . This constitutes an offline
attack on 𝐾 , which can only be defended against if the fingerprints
have high entropy (i.e., they are hard to guess). In practice, state-of-
the-art ZIP schemes already require multiple minutes or even hours
to obtain fingerprints >128 bits from context [17, 18, 28, 29, 36].
Even worse, an in-depth entropy analysis reveals that fingerprints
of these schemes contain bit patterns or predictable distributions of
0- and 1-bits [3, 13]. Thus, an adversary can more easily guess the
fingerprints, exposing state-of-the-art schemes to offline attacks.
fPAKE Protocol. fPAKE used by FastZIP allows reducing the num-
ber of required fingerprint bits, hence shortening pairing time,
while providing resilience to offline attacks. In essence, fPAKE is
also a fuzzy commitment, but instead of creating the commitment
from fingerprint 𝑓 , fPAKE adds an interactive entropy amplification
phase that turns fingerprints 𝑓 , 𝑓 ′ into high entropy keys k, k′ with
a similar mismatch pattern as 𝑓 , 𝑓 ′ (cf. Figure 2). In entropy ampli-
fication, fPAKE leverages an established cryptographic primitive
called password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) [1], which
allows two parties to exchange a secure (i.e., 128-bit and uniform)
key from a shared short string, such as a password, or even a bit.
The PAKE protocol is secure against offline attacks, meaning that
the best possible adversarial strategy is to guess the short string and
engage in the key exchange. In fPAKE, PAKE is used to amplify the
entropy of individual fingerprint bits as follows: Devices A and B
run multiple standard PAKE [1] protocols on the individual finger-
print bits in parallel, obtaining key vectors k and k′, where k𝑖 = k′𝑖
if the 𝑖-th fingerprint bits matched. Next, Device A chooses a 128-bit
secret 𝑠 and sends a fuzzy commitment 𝑐𝑜𝑚 ← ECC.Encode(𝑠) ⊕ k
to Device B, which decodes it with k′. Afterwards, Devices A and B
confirm to each other that they know 𝑠 by sending each other hash
values 𝐻 (𝑠 | |0) and 𝐻 (𝑠 ′ | |1) of the secret. Finally, if the hash check
succeeds, Devices A and B derive a shared key 𝑘𝐴𝐵 from 𝑠 using a
key derivation function (KDF).
Advantages of fPAKE in ZIP. By using high entropy keys in the
fuzzy commitment phase (cf. Figure 2), fPAKE prevents an eaves-
dropping adversary from mounting an offline attack because the
adversary only knows 𝑐⊕k, which is a secure encryption of 𝑐 under a
(by the guarantees of PAKE) secure key k. Moreover, even an active
adversary (e.g., malicious Device B) can try exactly one fingerprint
guess 𝑓 ′ as input to the interactive entropy amplification phase.
If that one guess is too far (i.e., 𝑓 and 𝑓 ′ are dissimilar), even the
unbounded adversary cannot recover 𝑠 , making the offline attack
2The 140 bits are for an expanded encoding allowing up to 10%mismatching fingerprint
bits. To allow for 30% mismatch in fingerprints, 205 bits are required.
Device A Device B
Entropy Amplification Phase












𝑐 ′ = 𝑐 ⊕ k′
𝑠 ′ = ECC(𝑐 ′)
ℎ = 𝐻 (𝑠 | |0)
check ℎ′
𝑘𝐴𝐵 = 𝐾𝐷𝐹 (𝑠)
check ℎ
ℎ′ = 𝐻 (𝑠 ′ | |1)
𝑘𝐴𝐵 = 𝐾𝐷𝐹 (𝑠 ′)
Figure 2: Detailed flow diagram of the fPAKE protocol.
impossible. Otherwise, if the guess is “close enough” (cf. Section 4),
the active adversary can attempt an offline attack. However, Device
A waits for the key confirmation ℎ′ within a short timeout (e.g., a
few seconds), allowing the adversary only this amount of time to
perform the attack. We note that for standard fuzzy commitments
the key confirmation upon timeout cannot similarly limit the offline
attack, as the adversary does not participate in the protocol.
In Section 4, we demonstrate how to leverage the strong security
of fPAKE against offline attacks to reduce the required fingerprint
sizeswell below 128 bits in many settings. Also, we empirically show
that additional communication overhead of fPAKE (i.e., entropy am-
plification phase) is negligible compared to up to three times faster
pairing time when using fPAKE instead of fuzzy commitments.
3 SYSTEM AND THREAT MODELS
We introduce our system model, describing the goal, requirements,
and assumptions of FastZIP , and our threat model, detailing adver-
sary’s goals and capabilities.
System Model. The main goal of FastZIP is to establish a shared
secret key between colocated devices within a trusted boundary
(e.g., inside a car) based on the perceived context. We design FastZIP
to fulfill the following requirements: (1) be free of user interaction
during pairing (usability), (2) have short pairing time (practicality),
and (3) work on commodity devices equipped with off-the-shelf
sensors (deployability). To achieve the main goal while satisfying
the requirements, we make the following assumptions: (1) devices
running FastZIP do not have any pre-shared secrets, nor any jointly
trusted third party, (2) they communicate using Wi-Fi or Bluetooth,
and share a common set of sensors such as an accelerometer, gyro-
scope, and barometer, and (3) they begin measuring context upon
receiving the “start” command from the car’s infotainment system,
which is assumed to be non-compromised.
Threat Model.We consider an adversary whose goal is to estab-
lish a shared secret key with a legitimate device while residing
outside the trusted boundary. In particular, the adversary attempts
to either impersonate one of the legitimate devices or acts as a man-
in-the-middle between a pair of devices. The adversary can neither
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compromise legitimate devices nor break cryptographic primitives,
however, they fully control a wireless channel, are equipped with
the same sensing hardware as legitimate devices, and have four
attack capabilities. In an injection attack, the adversary attempts to
pair with legitimate devices using self-chosen context readings. In
a replay attack, the adversary replays precollected context readings.
In a similar-context attack, the adversary tries to actively match
their context with legitimate devices. In the intra-car pairing, the
adversary launching a replay attack replays the precollected context
data from a route driven by a victim car carrying legitimate devices,
while in a similar-context attack, they actively follow the victim
car to capture similar context such as the road bumpiness. The first
three attacks require the adversary to participate in the pairing
protocol, while in an offline attack, they record a successful pair-
ing session and try to compute a shared key from it by repeatedly
guessing fingerprints used by legitimate devices.
4 SYSTEM DESIGN
We present the architecture of FastZIP , describing its modules: ac-
tivity filter, quantization, and key exchange.
System Overview. The main goal of FastZIP is to share a sym-
metric key between a pair of devices utilizing their context. In a
moving car the context encompasses road turns, bumpiness, and
speed changes [6, 34, 45], and it can be perceived by accelerome-
ter, gyroscope, and barometer sensors that are ubiquitous in smart
devices. FastZIP works as follows (cf. Figure 3): Devices A and B
capture their context using a set of common sensors. The resulting
sensor readings are input to the activity filter to discard low-entropy
context, which can be predicted by an adversary. Afterwards, the
filtered sensor readings are input to the quantization translating
them into a sequence of fingerprint bits. Each device constructs
its fingerprint by concatenating sub-fingerprints derived from dif-
ferent sensors (i.e., sensor fusion). These fingerprints are input to
the fPAKE protocol, which outputs a shared symmetric key if the
fingerprints have a sufficient number of similar bits.
Activity Filter. The security of any ZIP scheme relies on the unpre-
dictability of context from outside a trusted boundary (e.g., car inte-
rior). The low-entropy context undermines security of ZIP schemes,
allowing an adversary to guess fingerprints derived from it [13].
FastZIP utilizes the activity filter to ensure that fingerprints are
obtained from context data with sufficient entropy.
To estimate the entropy of a sensor signal, we analyze its strength
relative to noise and variation. For that, we employ threemetrics: av-
erage power, signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and the number of prominent
peaks, which are used to characterize signal’s quality [23, 27, 45].
The average power and SNR are applicable to all sensors, while
prominent peaks is a complementary metric for rapidly changing
modalities (e.g., acceleration), ensuring their sufficient variation.
We compute the average power 𝑃𝑠 in dB of a discrete sensor signal
𝑠 (𝑡) as follows:








We cannot compute SNR as the ratio of signal to noise power, as we
do not have the estimate of the latter; estimating noise power will
impose additional processing overhead. Thus, we use an alternative






























Figure 3: Systemoverview. FastZIP takes as input a set of sen-
sor readings from two devices. The readings are quantized to
similar fingerprints and afterwards input to the fPAKE pro-




[4]. To find prominent peaks in a signal, we count
peaks that have sufficient height relative to the highest peak, while
being within minimum distance Δ𝑃 from each other. Figures 4a
and 4b show activity filter metrics computed for two acceleration
signals (prominent peaks marked with ✖). We see that the former
signal captures continuous activity, exhibiting sufficient entropy,
while the latter signal contains noise in its right half, which is
reflected in the computed metrics.
After computing the metrics, we check them against fixed thresh-
olds to discard signals with insufficient entropy, which, in turn, may
reduce availability of FastZIP . To avoid this, we apply the activity
filter on a continuous stream of sensor data using an overlapping
sliding window. Thus, parts of the signal containing sufficient en-
tropy are considered in both preceding and following timeslots,
making it possible to retain them.
Quantization. Quantization translates a sensor signal (e.g., accel-
eration) to fingerprint bits used in a key agreement protocol. To
ensure security, the produced fingerprints must be sufficiently un-
predictable. Prior work [3, 13] finds that quantization methods of
state-of-the-art ZIP schemes generate fingerprints with patterns
(e.g., containing more 0-bits). We design the quantization of FastZIP
with three goals in mind: it must (1) generate fingerprints that are
random, (2) apply across various sensors, and (3) reveal minimum
information about the input sensor signal. The last goal seeks to
reduce adversary’s knowledge about the input sensor signal leaked
by quantization (e.g., signal range [16]).
We quantize short sensor signals of several seconds, producing
fingerprints of a few dozen bits. However, our method generalizes
to longer signals and fingerprints. The advantage of using short
input signals is twofold: (1) it forces an adversary to guess context
captured by a sensor within a precision of a few seconds, (2) it
requires less processing, improving the runtime performance of
FastZIP . Our quantization takes a sensor signal 𝑆 of length 𝑁 sam-
ples as input and outputs a fingerprint 𝑓 of 𝑀 bits (cf. Figure 4c).
Specifically, we first find a quantization threshold 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑄 (solid red
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(c) Signal quantized to bits
Figure 4: Activity filter applied to acceleration signals (a) and (b); Quantization applied to a gyroscope signal (c).
line in Figure 4c) that splits the signal horizontally into upper and
lower parts. The threshold is computed from the median of the
signal, ensuring that the same number of samples lie above and
below it. This way of selecting𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑄 leads to improved randomness
of the fingerprints (cf. Section 6.5) and is efficient to implement.
Second, we place the quantization points 𝑝1, . . . , 𝑝𝑀 (marked as ✚






+ Y from each other, covering the signal completely.
The number of quantization points and Δ𝑄 are public parameters
customized for each sensor modality (cf. Section 6.1). Using public
parameters has the advantage of (1) fewer communication rounds,
as they do not need to be exchanged during the pairing protocol,
and (2) not leaking information about a specific input signal, as the
parameters are derived from the class of signals of the same modal-
ity, and thus are general. Third, we obtain a bit in the fingerprint
𝑓 (𝑖) by comparing a signal value at the quantization point 𝑆 (𝑝𝑖 )
with the quantization threshold 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑄 :
𝑓 (𝑖) =
{
1, 𝑆 (𝑝𝑖 ) > 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑄
0, otherwise
Key Exchange. The main challenge of adapting fPAKE for the use
in FastZIP is to find which minimum fingerprint sizes3 are required
to securely exchange a 128-bit key, protecting against offline attacks.
With fPAKE we can choose arbitrarily small fingerprints, which are
then amplified to match the size of the encoded secret (cf. Figure 2).
By reducing the number of required fingerprint bits, we are able to
shorten pairing time, while providing sufficient security.
Before calculating the required fingerprint sizes, we determine
sufficient security levels for FastZIP . Specifically, we consider two
levels: (1) the minimal probability 𝑃 with which an offline attack
is eliminated and (2) the average complexity 𝐶 of an offline attack.
We set 𝑃 = 1− 2−20, namely an adversary actively participating in a
million pairing sessions can mount an offline attack in at most one
of them (without even learning which one). This level of security
is considered adequate for ZIP [29]. We set 𝐶 = 260, demanding
that an offline attack has an average complexity of at least 260
AES decryptions. We consider this complexity sufficient given that
attack time is limited to few seconds due to the key confirmation
timeouts that we augment the fPAKE protocol with (cf. Figure 2).
3Here, we assume fingerprints to be uniformly random bitstrings; entropy biases will
increase fingerprint sizes (cf. Section 6.5).
Table 1: Offline protection and brute-force complexity for
FastZIP computing 128-bit keys for different choices of simi-
larity thresholds and fingerprint sizes. Gray boxesmark suf-









95% 40 < 2−23 ≈ 237𝑇
90% 60 < 2−20 ≈ 232𝑇
85% 80 < 2−12 ≈ 260𝑇
80% 100 < 2−7 ≈ 263𝑇
75% 120 ≈ 1 ≈ 264𝑇
70% 140 ≈ 1 ≈ 260𝑇
We explain how to calculate the required fingerprint sizes, satis-
fying our chosen security levels using a 95% similarity threshold as
an example. The similarity threshold defines the amount of common
bits in two fingerprints needed to obtain a shared secret key. One
might think to set the fingerprint size |𝑓 | such that the probability
of guessing at least 0.95 · |𝑓 | bits correctly is smaller than 2−20, since
the key should be undecodable otherwise. Unfortunately, this is not
true: an ECC (used in fPAKE) correcting 5% mismatch between the
fingerprints leaks some information about the encoded secret until
up to 2 · 5% = 10% mismatch. Thus, an active adversary guessing
less than 90% of the fingerprint correctly learns nothing about the
secret. However, if the guessed fingerprint is “close enough” (i.e.,
90–95% of the bits), the adversary cannot immediately decode the
secret but obtains an ambiguous encoding from which the secret
can be brute-forced. Taking this “security gap” inherent to ECCs
into account, we set |𝑓 | such that the probability ∑𝑛𝑖=𝑚 (𝑛𝑖 )/2𝑛 of
guessing𝑚 = (2 ·𝑇ℎ𝑟 −1) · |𝑓 | out of 𝑛 = |𝑓 | bits correctly is smaller
than 2−20, where 𝑇ℎ𝑟 is the target similarity threshold.
We note that |𝑓 | goes to infinity when𝑇ℎ𝑟 approaches 75%, since
2·25% = 50% of a random bitstring is easy to guess. Thus, full protec-
tion against offline attacks with probability at least 1 − 2−20 is only
possible for thresholds over 75%, requiring short fingerprints of 40–
60 bits for thresholds above 90% (cf. Table 1). Below 90%, the security
of FastZIP relies on our other security level measuring brute-force
complexity of the offline attack. For estimating this complexity, we
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think of ECC encodings as consisting of 𝑛 = |𝑓 | parts which are cor-
rect or wrong depending on whether the corresponding fingerprint
bit was correct or not. We use the following brute-force method to
decode an ambiguous encoding: randomly guess which𝑚 parts of
the encoding are correct, decode only them, and set the secret to
be the first result that appears twice. Considering that we do not
know how many parts 𝑖 of the codeword are actually correct, the
conditional probability of guessing𝑚 out of 𝑖 correct parts in the 𝑛
parts long encoding is given by the hypergeometric distribution as
𝑖𝑚/𝑛𝑚 , which finds its maximum at 𝑖 = (𝑛 −𝑚)/2. The complex-
ity of the offline attack is thus lower bounded by 𝑛𝑚/(𝑛 −𝑚)𝑚𝑇 .
Here, 𝑇 is the complexity of ECC.Decode, which is larger than the
complexity of one AES decryption.
Table 1 shows the calculated fingerprint sizes providing suffi-
cient security for FastZIP based on fPAKE for a range of similarity
thresholds. In Section 7, we elaborate that these findings are generic,
thus can be directly reused by other ZIP schemes.
5 INTRA-CAR DEVICE PAIRING
We present intra-car device pairing—an exemplary use case of
FastZIP to pair devices inside a moving car. It enables novel ve-
hicular applications such as pairing user devices for customized
driving experience or pairing ECUs for travel efficiency [9, 35]. We
first provide the case overview followed by implementation details.
Case Overview. There is a growing number of on-board smart
devices in modern cars, including devices of drivers and passen-
gers (e.g., smartphone, earbuds) as well as ECUs and infotainment
systems [9, 20]. The prohibitive user effort to pair these devices,
many of which lack user interfaces, justifies the use of FastZIP for
intra-car device pairing. FastZIP utilizes four sensor modalities to
capture the context of a moving car: vertical and horizontal acceler-
ation, gyroscope sky-axis, and barometer. Our review of prior work
shows that acceleration of a moving car can be decomposed into
vertical and horizontal components, with the former capturing road
conditions (i.e., bumpiness), while the latter—driving patterns and
traffic conditions (i.e., acceleration/deceleration) [6]. A gyroscope
measures car’s turns and steering directions [45], while a barometer
captures altitude changes when a car moves along the road [34].
5.1 Implementation
Data Collection.We develop an Android app to collect accelerom-
eter, gyroscope, and barometer data at fixed sampling rates (i.e.,
100 Hz for accelerometer and gyroscope; 10 Hz for barometer).
We convert accelerometer and gyroscope data to the world coor-
dinates, eliminating the effect of device orientation. Before data
collection, we perform an Network Time Protocol (NTP) update on
smartphones, ensuring consistent data timestamps, which we use
to synchronize the start of sensor recordings of colocated devices.
Data Processing.We process the collected sensor data before feed-
ing it into the activity filter. Prior to any processing, we resample
the data to the set sampling rates, eliminating the effect of sampling
rate instability [38]. To decompose acceleration into vertical and
horizontal components, we (1) remove the Earth’s gravity from the
accelerometer data applying a non-overlapping 5-second sliding
window and (2) use the estimated Earth’s gravity to perform the de-
composition [6]. For the gyroscope data, transformed to the world
coordinates by our app, we select a Z-axis that is perpendicular to
the road surface. We convert the barometer data 𝑝 to altitude ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑡
in meters using a standard pressure-height formula [34]:








After converting the sensor data to a required format, we perform
signal smoothing and noise reduction in two steps: (1) applying
them on the whole data and (2) on signals of several seconds, parti-
tioning these data. To remove low-frequency noise and smooth the
whole data without distorting it (e.g., keep peak locations), we use
a Savitzky-Golay (SG) filter with a window length 3 and degree 2
polynomial. Afterwards, we apply a Gaussian filter with a sigma of
1.4 to reduce high-frequency noise.
We use the same sequence of filters on sensor signals of sev-
eral seconds: the SG filter has a window length 5 and degree 3
polynomial for finger-grained smoothing, while the Gaussian filter
stays the same. For the acceleration signals, we afterwards apply an
exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) filter to smooth
them further, while keeping their significant changes; the EWMA
alpha is set to 0.16 and 0.2 for vertical and horizontal acceleration,
respectively. For the altitude signals, we perform mean subtraction
before filtering. This helps to (1) remove offset between barometer
sensors caused by hardware and temperature variation [14], (2)
eliminate atmospheric pressure, accentuating altitude changes in
the signal. We adapt filter parameters for signal smoothing and
noise reduction from related work [6, 17, 27].
Activity Filter. The activity filter applies to a processed sensor
signal of several seconds. We implement it by computing the av-
erage power and SNR for all modalities, and counting prominent
peaks for vertical and horizontal acceleration (cf. Section 4). To pass
the activity filter, a signal must have the average power, SNR, and
optionally the number of prominent peaks higher than a predefined
threshold, which we find empirically. The signal that passes the
activity filter is input to the quantization, otherwise it is discarded.
Quantization. We implement quantization, converting a sensor
signal to fingerprint bits, as described in Section 4. Its parameters
(i.e., signal length, number of output bits) are set empirically for
each modality (cf. Section 6.1). We compute the quantization thresh-
old as a median of the sensor signal; for vertical and horizontal
acceleration, we add small Δ to the median, reducing the effect of
sensor noise on quantization. We concatenate bits quantized from
the sensor signal with bits derived from other modalities likewise
before inputting them as one fingerprint to the fPAKE protocol.
FastZIP Prototype.We implement FastZIP to evaluate its runtime
performance on off-the-shelf IoT devices (cf. Section 6.6). We focus
on the fPAKE protocol, as the underlying functionality takes either
constant (e.g., sensing) or negligible time (e.g., quantization). The
FastZIP prototype allows two devices with similar fingerprints to es-
tablish a shared symmetric key. Our implementation is modular and
agnostic to the fingerprint derivation, making it directly reusable
by other ZIP schemes. To implement the fPAKE protocol, we use
primitives from a Python cryptography library [39]. For the ECC,
we utilize Shamir’s secret sharing scheme in its error-correcting
variant (i.e., introducing redundancy by adding more point-value
pairs of the polynomial) [10]. For the PAKE component, we use the
Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) protocol [1], built as Diffie-Hellman






Acv    




Figure 5: Experiment setup. Smartphones are placed at five
various spots inside each of two cars driving the same route.
key exchange symmetrically encrypted with passwords. Our fPAKE
implementation supports two security levels, generating keys of
128- and 244-bits. We enable communication between devices utiliz-
ing IP sockets and data serialization [40, 41], allowing us to run the
FastZIP prototype in real-time. To benchmark our implementation,
we employ a Python time module [42].
6 EVALUATION
We present a comprehensive evaluation of FastZIP based on the
real-world data we collect.
Experiment Setup.We collect accelerometer, gyroscope, and barom-
eter data from four cars driven in a number of scenarios: within a
city, on country roads, on a highway, and inside a parking garage for
a total of 800 km. To evaluate the suitability of FastZIP for various
cars, we collect these data using (1) two similar cars (Opel Astra
wagons; 400 km of driving) and (2) two different cars (Škoda Oc-
tavia sedan and Volkswagen Golf hatchback; 400 km of driving). In
both experiments, we equip two cars with five smartphones each,
covering spots where smart devices are typically found [6, 13]: on a
dashboard, between front seats, behind driver and passenger seats,
and inside a trunk (cf. Figure 5). Then, we collect sensor data from
two cars driven as such: (1) one car starts a predefined route, fol-
lowed by another car after a 10–15 minute lag, (2) two cars drive
one after another, changing the distance between each other and
the role of a leading vehicle. We cover a similar number of kilome-
ters for city, country, and highway driving. In the parking scenario,
cars leave an underground garage and return back to it multiple
times. To collect the sensor data, we utilize Nexus 5X and Nexus 6P
smartphones. After data processing (cf. Section 5.1), we use vertical
and horizontal acceleration (labeled as Acv and Ach, respectively),
gyroscope sky-axis (Gyr), and altitude computed from barometer
(Bar) in our evaluation.
Reproducibility andReusability.We release the collected sensor
dataset along with the driven routes map and the source code of our
data collection app, evaluation stack, and FastZIP prototype [12].
6.1 Methodology
We evaluate FastZIP using several criteria: (1) security and usability,
(2) pairing time, and (3) runtime performance. To assess security,
we compute False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and evaluate entropy of
our fingerprints. A false acceptance occurs when non-colocated
devices in different cars (cf. Figure 5) pair because their fingerprints
are similar enough. We assess usability by computing True Accep-
tance Rate (TAR), showing the rate of successful pairings between
colocated devices inside the same car. For a detailed analysis of
FARs and TARs, we compute them on the full data of an experi-
ment (e.g., similar cars) and on the subsets of data corresponding to
driving in one of our scenarios: city, country, highway, and parking.
To evaluate pairing time, we find the amount of context data (in
seconds) required to pair securely, while for runtime performance
we benchmark the FastZIP prototype on the Raspberry Pi.
System Parameters.We use the collected sensor data to find con-
figuration parameters for FastZIP’s modules: activity filter, quan-
tization, and fPAKE yielding the best trade-off between security
and short pairing time. To find the length of sensor signal to derive
fingerprint bits, we examine how much sensor data is required to
capture typical ambient activity (e.g., car turn by Gyr). Our results
show that 10 seconds of Acv, Ach, and Gyr data capture typical road
bumpiness, acceleration patterns, and car turns, while 20 seconds of
Bar data is enough to record altitude changes. We set these signal
lengths as input to the activity filter and to quantization, using
them to empirically find thresholds for activity filter metrics for
each sensor modality.
To choose the number of fingerprint bits output by quantization,
we investigate (1) the good ratio between high TAR and low FAR
and (2) modality variation. The latter helps us understand how
many uncorrelated bits can be extracted from the sensor signal.
Based on our findings, we set the number of fingerprint bits to
24 for both Acv and Ach, 16 for Gyr, and 12 for Bar. A similarity
threshold defines the level of similarity between two fingerprints
required to establish pairing. To select similarity thresholds, we
study how many bits typically differ in the fingerprints of colocated
devices. We set the following thresholds, balancing high TAR and
low FAR, to be used in the fPAKE protocol: 70.8% (Acv), 75% (Ach),
93.7% (Gyr), and 91.7% (Bar).
6.2 Pairing between Colocated Devices
We compute TARs between each pair of colocated devices inside
the same car, providing the average TAR. First, we present TARs for
individual sensors (e.g., Acv) followed by the evaluation of sensor
fusion. Our results are consistent across the similar and different
cars experiments, indicating generalizability of FastZIP to various
cars. In the following, we provide typical TARs.
TARs of Individual Sensors. Figure 6a depicts TARs for the first
car in the similar cars experiment. We see that full TARs range
between 0.84 and 0.91, showing that the individual sensors alone
achieve relatively high success rates. However, the TARs of sce-
narios (e.g., city) have higher variation: while Ach and Gyr exhibit
fairly consistent TARs, Bar and especially Acv show a wider spread
of TARs. For Acv, the TAR spread is caused by diverse bumpiness
perception inside a car affected by such factors as car suspension
(e.g., front vs. rear) and surface on which bumpiness is measured
(e.g., plastic vs. fabric). These factors become important when a
car moves slowly, reducing TARs as in the city and parking, while
higher speed leads to more profound bumpiness, increasing TARs as
in the country and highway. For Bar, higher speed causes profound
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(d) FARs: similar-context attack
Figure 7: Effect of sensor fusion on TrueAcceptance Rates (TARs) and False Acceptance Rates (FARs) for representative subsets
of scenarios; we connect markers for readability, the plots do not show a time series.
altitude changes, improving TARs (e.g., highway), while there are
few such changes when traveling short distances, reducing TARs
(e.g., parking). In contrast, Ach and Gyr show lower TARs when a
car moves at constant speed (e.g., highway). These sensors benefit
from non-monotonic driving with many stops, leading to distinct
acceleration patterns (Ach) and sharp turns (Gyr), as in the city and
parking. Thus, no sensor outperforms the others in all the scenarios,
and they show potential for complementing each other.
We analyze TAR deviation inside a car, finding that longer dis-
tance between devices leads to lower TARs. This happens because
context signals (e.g., road bumpiness) can be attenuated or perceived
with varying intensity at distant spots. We find that rapidly chang-
ing sensors (i.e., Acv, Ach) can have up to 20 percentage points
of TAR difference between farthest devices, while for gradually
changing sensors (i.e., Gyr, Bar) it is below five percentage points.
TARs with Sensor Fusion.We fuse sensors by concatenating sub-
fingerprints of different modalities derived in the same timeframe.
Thus, we obtain more fingerprint bits in less time, speeding up
pairing. We explore the fusion of two, three, and all of our sensors.
Our findings show that sensor fusion generally increases TARs,
while reducing their deviation between devices. This happens be-
cause sensors can reinforce each other in the following way: error
correction bits unused in the sub-fingerprint of highest similarity
allow fixing extra errors in another sub-fingerprint, making the
fused fingerprint exceed the similarity threshold, improving the
TAR. Such reinforcing effect leads to the fused TAR to be either
close to the highest TAR in sensor combination or even exceed it.
The latter outcome is typical for sensor combinations including Ach
and Gyr, which often capture co-occuring ambient activity (e.g.,
decelerate when turning).
Figure 7a shows a subset of fused TARs for the second car in the
similar cars experiment. We see that by adding more sensors TARs
steadily increase from left to right: ranging from (0.65, 0.89) for
individual modalities to (0.85, 0.93) when fusing all of them. With
the TAR of 0.9 colocated devices would need 1.1 pairing attempts on
average to pair successfully. In few cases, sensors do not reinforce
each other, namely combinations including Acv and Bar, and Acv
and Gyr in the parking and city, leading to reduced TARs. For Acv
and Bar, both have lowest TARs in these scenarios (cf. Figure 6a), so
combining them increases the number of mismatching bits in the
fused fingerprint. We find that Acv and Gyr often capture disjoint
ambient activity (e.g., high speed: intense bumpiness but no turns),
explaining lower potential for reinforcing each other.
6.3 Resilience to Attacks
We compute FARs between each pair of non-colocated devices in
different cars, presenting the average FAR under injection, replay,
and similar-context attacks (cf. Section 3). Similar to TAR, we first
provide FARs for individual sensors and then evaluate their fusion,
obtaining consistent results across similar and different cars experi-
ments. In the following, we provide typical FARs.
Injection Attack.We use sensor data collected inside a parked car
capturing noise to pair with legitimate devices. Figure 6b depicts
FARs of individual sensors computed for the first car in the similar
cars experiment. We see that three out of four modalities show FARs
above 0.03, making this low-effort attack practical. However, inject-
ing sensor noise does not work on Gyr because car turns result in
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distinct up and down peaks in the signal (cf. Figure 4c) that are not
common for noise. With sensor fusion, FARs drop below half a per-
centage point using two modalities, converging to zero by adding
more sensors (cf. Figure 7b). This result is the opposite of the rein-
forcing effect in TARs, showing that with more sensors differences
between non-colocated fingerprints grow, reducing FARs.
We also try injecting sensor signals that are collected in a moving
car but do not pass the activity filter. In this case, FARs grow by an
extra percentage point for Acv, Ach, and Bar, while for Gyr they
increase by order of magnitude: up to 0.005. Thus, low-entropy
sensor signals from a moving car slightly improve the attack, while
sensor fusion has the same effect as in Figure 7b.
Replay Attack.We replay sensor signals passing the activity filter
from one car to pair with devices in another car; both cars have
driven the same route. In the first case, we do not synchronize such
replayed signals. Figure 6c depicts FARs of individual sensors for
the first car in the similar cars experiment. Compared to injection
attack, FARs show a fourfold increase for Gyr and Bar, remaining
similar for Acv and Ach. The altitude change (Bar) on a given route
has least variation, allowing successfully replay (i.e., FAR of up to
0.2), while other sensors are less affected. We can reach zero FARs
by fusing more than two sensors (cf. Figure 7c).
In the second case, we replay sensor signals from periods when
both cars drive the same part of the route (e.g., in a city) using a
rough timeline of their travel. We see an extra twofold increase in
FARs of Gyr and Bar peaking at 0.07 and 0.38, respectively, while
for Acv and Ach the growth is 1–3 percentage points. Thus, all sen-
sors have FAR above 0.05, making this attack alarming. The sensor
fusion leads to zero FARs as in Figure 7c, showing its importance
to prevent replay attacks.
Similar-context Attack. We use sensor signals passing the activ-
ity filter from one car to pair with devices in another car when two
cars drive one after another (cf. Figure 5). We grant the adversary
an unfair advantage of matching a single sensor (e.g., Acv). It means
that they always “guess” the closest fingerprint to the legitimate
one; the adversarial and legitimate fingerprints are derived from
temporally close sensor signals. Figure 7d depicts the best achiev-
able FARs for this attack. We see that none of individual sensors can
prevent the similar-context attack alone, showing FARs between
0.3 and 0.9 (leftmost of the graph). As in the replay, Bar that has
least variation is the most vulnerable followed by Ach and Acv. For
Ach and Acv, FARs are caused by shared road conditions such speed
limits leading to consistent decelerations (Ach) and road cracks
resulting in similar bumpiness (Acv). Gyr is the most robust to this
attack because it captures human-specific steering behavior, which
varies between drivers.
We see that fusing two sensors cannot prevent the similar-context
attack, especially when combining low-varying Bar with other
modalities (cf. peak in the middle of Figure 7d). By adding three
and more sensors, we achieve nearly zero FARs, emphasizing the
necessity for sensor fusion to mitigate advanced attacks in ZIP.
6.4 Pairing Time
We compare pairing time of FastZIP utilizing fPAKE and state-of-
the-art ZIP schemes based on fuzzy commitments. To enable a
fair comparison, we assume the number of fingerprint bits and
Table 2: Calculated pairing times for FastZIP (fPAKE) and





Fingerprint Bits Pairing Time (s)
fPAKE F. com. fPAKE F. com.
Acv (V) 70.8% 140 203 60 90
Ach (H) 75.0% 120 192 50 80
Gyr (G) 93.7% 50 145 40 100
Bar (B) 91.7% 60 147 100 260
V+H 72.9% 130 198 30 50
V+G 80.0% 100 180 30 50
V+B 77.8% 110 185 80 120
H+G 82.5% 90 173 30 50
H+B 80.5% 100 178 60 100
G+B 92.9% 55 147 40 120
V+H+G 78.1% 110 185 20 30
V+H+B 76.7% 120 188 40 80
V+G+B 82.7% 90 173 40 80
H+G+B 84.6% 80 168 40 80
All 80.2% 100 179 40 60
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Figure 8: Pairing times obtained from our sensor data for
FastZIP (fPAKE) and state-of-the-art ZIP schemes (Fuzzy
commitments: F. com.).
time to derive them to be the same (cf. Section 6.1) and evaluate
pairing time on the level of the cryptographic protocol, namely
fPAKE vs. fuzzy commitments. First, we calculate how much time it
takes to obtain enough fingerprint bits to provide security against
offline attacks for fPAKE and fuzzy commitments. For the former,
we use findings in Table 1, while for the latter we target a 128-bit
fingerprint, accounting for entropy loss due to error correction [29]:
|𝑓 |𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦_𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 = |𝑓 |𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 2 · (1 − 𝑡ℎ𝑟 ) · |𝑓 |𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡
Here, 𝑡ℎ𝑟 denotes a similarity threshold. Table 2 shows the resulting
pairing times, demonstrating that FastZIP requires 20–40 seconds
to pair in the majority of cases, while state-of-the-art schemes need
1.5–3 times longer time under the same conditions.
Second, we evaluate the time required to accumulate fingerprint
bits for fPAKE and fuzzy commitments in Table 2 by traversing our
collected sensor data with an overlapping sliding window using a
5-second step (cf. Activity Filter in Section 4 for reasoning). Figure 8
gives pairing times obtained on the full data of the first car in the
different cars experiment, confirming the 1.5–3 faster pairing time
of FastZIP . The calculated and obtained from our data pairing times
are close to each other; the latter pairing times for Bar and its fusion
combinations are even smaller, as the length of the Bar signal (i.e.,
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Figure 9: Distribution of fingerprint randomwalks for dif-
ferent sensors. Expected binomial distribution in red.
20 seconds) is significantly bigger than the sliding window step. We
see that pairing times obtained from our data shorten in the case
of profound ambient activity (e.g., Acv on highway), and pairing
time consistency inside a car depends on device location for Acv
and Ach, while it is stable for Gyr and Bar.
Above, we have shown how much reduction in pairing time can
be achieved by using fPAKE instead of fuzzy commitments. FastZIP
also utilizes sensor fusion as compared to a single sensor modality
used by state-of-the-art ZIP schemes. The effect of sensor fusion
on pairing time can be seen in Table 2 and Figure 8. The maximum
reduction of pairing time is proportional to the number of used
sensors (e.g., three times shorter with three sensors as compared to
one), assuming each sensor obtains the same number of bits in the
same amount of time. From Table 2 (cf. fPAKE pairing time), we see
that for Acv, Ach, and Gyr (each requires 10 seconds to produce one
fingerprint) the reduction in pairing time is 2–3 times when fusing
all three sensors. It is smaller in some cases than the maximum
possible reduction because each sensor outputs a different number
of bits after error correction due to varying similarity thresholds.
In our setting, sensor fusion allows FastZIP to shorten pairing time
by an extra 2–3 times in addition to what is gained by fPAKE.
Combining more sensors would further reduce pairing time.
6.5 Entropy of Fingerprints
To evaluate entropy of fingerprints produced by FastZIP , we (1)
examine them for biases (e.g., bit patterns) and (2) estimate their
min-entropy. To identify biases, we represent our fingerprints as
random walks, with 1- and 0-bits showing steps in positive and
negative directions [3, 13]. The result follows a binomial distribution
if fingerprints are uniformly random. We also study bit transition
probabilities, interpreting each bit position in a fingerprint as a state
in a Markov chain. Figure 9 depicts the results of random walks for
individual sensors. The distributions for all sensors are centered
around the mean, indicating that overall fingerprints have the equal
number of 0- and 1-bits. We see that more unique fingerprints can
be generated from modalities with higher variation (e.g., Acv). The
Markov property is close to 0.5 for all sensors, showing that the
probability of each bit in a fingerprint to be 0 or 1 is equal. These





































Figure 10: Min-entropy of FastZIP fingerprints estimated by
NIST SP800-90B test suite (entropy in 1 bit).
findings reveal no biases in our fingerprints, indicating that our
quantization achieves its design goals (cf. Section 4).
To assessmin-entropy, we apply theNIST SP 800-90B test suite [31,
44]. It consists of ten entropy estimators and is widely used [5, 25,
49]. Figure 10 shows the estimated min-entropy for fingerprints of
individual and fused sensors. We obtain 0.43 bits of entropy for Acv,
0.19 bits for Ach, and below 0.05 bits for both Gyr and Bar, confirm-
ing our findings in Figure 9. Sensor fusion has a positive impact on
min-entropy, which either stays close to the highest min-entropy in
the combination or exceeds it. The fact that min-entropy increases
when combining different sensors, indicates that they are uncor-
related, preventing the adversary from inferring one sensor signal
from another. We consider the obtained entropy results to be con-
servative because the SP 800-90B suite is known to underestimate
min-entropy [50], and it makes a fair assessment given >106 data
samples, which we do not have. We find that dependency between
consecutive bits is a decisive factor in lowering min-entropy of
our fingerprints. To check if this is caused by quantization parame-
ters, we halve the number of bits in our fingerprints (cf. Reduced
in Figure 10), seeing only a modest increase in min-entropy. Thus,
min-entropy in our fingerprints is restricted by the lack of entropy
in the sensor data. In Section 7, we elaborate on attainable entropy
from our sensor data.
Figure 10 shows that the majority of fused fingerprints have
30–40% of truly random bits. Thus, we need to collect more data
to provide security, increasing pairing time of FastZIP by 2.5–3
times to 75–120 seconds. For state-of-the-art ZIP schemes, pairing
time grows by 7 times, reaching several minutes, as they are more
affected by non-random bits due to longer fingerprints.
6.6 Prototype Performance
We benchmark our FastZIP prototype on the Raspberry Pi 3 Model
B, recording its performance in terms of computation and communi-
cation overhead. Specifically, we randomly sample 2000 fingerprints
for each fusion combination, deploying them on two Raspberry Pis
(i.e., 1000 fingerprints on each) connected via a Wi-Fi router. We
measure the execution time to establish a 128-bit symmetric key on
each device, showing the average performance in Figure 114. We
observe a maximum time of around 4.4 seconds for two sensors (i.e.,
Acv + Ach), growing to 8.2 seconds when fusing all of them. The
4We use fingerprints from our evaluation. Accounting for entropy loss in the finger-
prints (cf. Table 2) will increase the execution time by a few seconds.
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Figure 11: Performance of FastZIP for 128-bit key output.
execution time depends on the fingerprint size, and its deviation
from the average performance increases with a lower similarity
threshold (e.g., Acv + Ach vs. Gyr + Bar). We see that 60–80% of the
execution time accounts for the communication overhead, which
can be reduced using a direct link between devices. Rising the
output key size from 128 to 244 bits proportionally increases the
execution time. Overall, FastZIP runs efficiently on off-the-shelf IoT
devices, imposing only a few seconds of overhead. Our prototype
is Python-based without performance optimization techniques. Its
building blocks (cf. Section 5.1) can be reimplemented in C to deploy
FastZIP on more constrained devices.
7 DISCUSSION
We provide relevant discussion points for FastZIP .
Generalizability. We show how to adapt the building blocks of
FastZIP : activity filter, quantization, and fPAKE to be used for ZIP
in other use cases (e.g., smart home, wearables). Our activity fil-
ter utilizes generic metrics: average power, SNR, and number of
prominent peaks that can be computed on any sensor signal. To
find metrics thresholds, excluding low-entropy signals, we examine
metrics of sensor signals of fixed length (e.g., 10 seconds), capturing
strong and weak ambient activity. With this approach, we obtain
thresholds suitable for different cars and road types. Similar re-
sults are reported for the average power threshold of audio signals
recorded in different places [23]. Hence, thresholds for activity fil-
ter metrics can be determined once per use case and sensor type.
Our activity filter can be easily adapted by wearable ZIP utilizing
human gait captured by the acceleromter. Specifically, all three met-
rics (prominent peaks can mark gait cycles) are computed on gait
signals of chosen length (e.g., 30 seconds), while metrics thresholds
can be derived using public gait data of moving and still users [36].
FastZIP quantization has worked well on four sensor modalities.
To apply it for other ZIP use cases, two parameters need to be ad-
justed: (1) length of input sensor signal and (2) number of output
fingerprint bits. These parameters are set empirically based on the
duration and variation of scenario-specific ambient activity cap-
tured by the sensor signal. For example, in smart home, a door knock
event lasting a few seconds can be recorded by the microphone and
accelerometer [17]. The former signal has higher variation, thus
our quantization can be set to output more fingerprint bits from it.
Our fPAKE findings (cf. Table 1) are generic for a given similarity
threshold and security level, hence directly reusable by other ZIP
schemes. For a different choice of similar threshold/security level,
the required fingerprint size in bits providing protection against
offline attacks can be computed, as explained in Section 4.
Entropy of Sensor Data. The min-entropy presented in Figure 10
results from sensor data collected on high-quality flat roads, giving
the lower bound of attainable entropy. We do not cover gravel,
forest, or mountain roads that have profound bumpiness (Acv) and
sharp turns (Gyr). Also, we do not have representative data from
hectic metropolis driving, which should reveal distinct acceleration
patterns (Ach) as well as from hilly regions with rapidly chang-
ing altitude (Bar). These different road and traffic conditions have
high potential for increasing entropy in sensor data [18]. Another
way of obtaining more entropy from sensor data is customized
quantization. Our quantization focuses on (1) extracting bits from
heterogeneous sensors and (2) reducing entropy biases in finger-
prints, hence it may not be optimal in the amount of attainable
entropy. Prior work explores various quantization methods [3, 15]
some of which can be adapted to FastZIP .
Deployment Considerations. To deploy FastZIP in a real car set-
ting a few points need to be considered. First, devices are expected
to continuously sense their context before they establish pairing,
eliminating the need for time synchronization [17, 29] (i.e., each
device extracts fingerprints bits from common parts of context pass-
ing the activity filter). In other words, devices observe common
context events (e.g., road bump) in the same timeline (i.e., similar
to [17]) and can buffer them, tolerating clock offset between devices.
For this to work, devices must maintain the same sampling rate of
context measurements and start them simultaneously (e.g., upon a
broadcasted command). For example, a major component of the car
(e.g., infotainment system) can broadcast such a command when
a car is started. Since devices in the same car are located nearby,
they will receive this command almost at the same time. To further
eliminate the effect of different devices receiving the broadcasted
command at negligibly different times and account for overhead
to trigger sensing, devices can start measuring context upon the
command reception after a short pause (e.g., 5 seconds); for this
they do not need synchronized clocks as well. Furthermore, FastZIP
extracts much fewer bits from context signals (e.g., 24 bits from 10
seconds) as compared to existing ZIP schemes (e.g., 128 bits from 5
seconds in [48] or 512 bits from 6 seconds in [37]), making FastZIP
less susceptible to several millisecond offsets between these signals.
Specifically, we try injecting 5–7 millisecond offsets between con-
text signals that we used to evaluate FastZIP , finding that it would
reduce TARs of individual sensors (cf. Figure 6a) by maximum 10%
for Acv, 7% for Ach, and below 5% for Gyr and Bar, while FARs
remain the same. We consider this reduction to be acceptable for
a proof-of-concept FastZIP , however, further research can investi-
gate how to eliminate the effect of synchronization errors in real
deployments. Since FastZIP requires a few dozen seconds to pair,
collecting context for this time using low-power sensors will not
impose much overhead. Second, each device is expected to learn
parameters of the scheme (e.g., quantization) prior to pairing: in
FastZIP it can happen upon the scheme installation, as commonly
assumed in ZIP [17, 36, 47]. Before trying to pair, each device can
advertise its desired security level (e.g., 128- or 244-bits in fPAKE),
pairing with those devices that support the same security level.
Limitations. We evaluate FastZIP using devices fixed inside a car
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Table 3: Comparison with state-of-the-art ZIP schemes.
Scheme Use Case Time (s) (FAR, FRR) Bias
Schürm. & Sigg [37]† In-car 120 (0.10, 0.10) Low
Miettinen et al. [28]† In-car 1280 (0.23, 0.23) High
Convoy [18] In-car 300 - -
Miettinen et al. [29] Home 5640 (0.03, 0.02) -
Perceptio [17] Home 8280 - -
BANDANA [36] Wearables 96 - High
FastZIP In-car 20 (0.0, 0.06) Low
†evaluated in [13]. We show best achievable results for each scheme.
interior, covering the likely use case of pairing between a mounted
user device (e.g., smartphone) and an infotainment system. How-
ever, users may interact with their devices, affecting accelerometer
and gyroscope readings. Differentiating between human and vehi-
cle motion in the sensor data collected inside a moving car is an
open research question [6]. We envision that predicting sensor data
resulted from human motion [47] and filtering it afterwards [36]
can help address this question.
8 RELATEDWORK
To date, a number of ZIP schemes utilizing various sensors (e.g., mi-
crophone, accelerometer) to capture context have been proposed [17,
18, 27–29, 36, 37]. The state-of-the-art ZIP schemes rely on the fuzzy
commitments cryptographic primitive [22] to establish a shared
secret key. Other cryptographic alternatives include customized
extensions of fuzzy commitments [36] or the EKE protocol [15].
However, these extensions do not have proven security guarantees.
The majority of proposed ZIP schemes rely on a single common
sensor to capture context. The existing schemes utilizing fuzzy com-
mitments and context based on a single sensor modality suffer from
(1) prolonged pairing time, (2) vulnerability to offline attacks, and
(3) attacks caused by the predictable context (e.g., replay). FastZIP
overcomes these limitations by a novel design, namely combining
the fPAKE protocol [10] and multi-sensor context constructed by
combining multiple sensor modalities (i.e., sensor fusion).
Table 3 compares FastZIP and prominent state-of-the-art ZIP
schemes in terms of pairing time, error rates, and entropy biases
in the fingerprints. We note that this comparison is indicative, as
we use the information reported in the original publication for
each ZIP scheme. FastZIP has the shortest pairing time among the
schemes, including those that are used for in-car pairing, while
achieving low error rates. This shortest pairing time is due to the
combination of fPAKE and sensor fusion, which can together give a
3–9 reduction in pairing time (cf. Section 6.4). However, pairing time
also highly depends on the used context (e.g., continuous gait [36]
vs. infrequent knock [17]) and quantization method (e.g., in [28]
one bit is derived from two minutes of sensor data.)
The schemes [37] and [28] utilizing ambient audio and noise
levels, respectively, are evaluated for in-car pairing [13], showing
error rates above 0.1. Despite audio and noise level context varying
significantly in a running car, the fingerprints of those schemes
contain entropy biases (e.g., more 0-bits). Convoy that uses road
bumpiness captured by the accelerometer for pairing is vulnerable
to the context replay attack [18], however the resulting FAR is
not reported. A similar work bears the same weakness as Convoy
but does not state the pairing time [24]. ZIP schemes for pairing
smart home devices [17, 29] may achieve comparable error rates
to FastZIP , requiring, however, at least two orders of magnitude
longer time. This time will further increase in the case of entropy
biases, which are not evaluated by the considered schemes. We
note that the longest pairing time of Perceptio [17] is a tradeoff, as
the scheme enables pairing between devices with heterogeneous
sensors (e.g., microphone and accelerometer). For ZIP schemes
targeting wearables such as BANDANA [36], utilizing human gait
captured by the accelerometer, the pairing time is closest to FastZIP .
However, such schemes often show bit patterns in their fingerprints
and are vulnerable to video-based attacks [3].
Our review of relatedZIPwork reveals important results: entropy
biases of various level of severity exist in fingerprints of all schemes.
This is worrying, as the state of the art relies on fuzzy commitments,
where high entropy of fingerprints is imperative to prevent offline
attacks. Also, none of the works explicitly accounts for entropy
biases (e.g., by saying how many more bits need to be collected).
The impact of entropy biases is less severe in fPAKE, as it limits the
offline attack in time and number of attempts. We notice that many
ZIP schemes use previous versions of NIST statistical tests [33] to
find entropy biases, reporting results for only passed tests, without
further investigation [26, 27, 48]. Thus, we urge researchers to
scrutinize the entropy of fingerprints derived from context with
recent NIST tests [44] and additional tools such as in [3, 13].
9 CONCLUSION
In the age of the Internet of Things (IoT) securing wireless com-
munication of smart devices is crucial to protect their data. Zero-
interaction pairing (ZIP) allows establishing a shared secret key
between devices based on their physical context (e.g., ambient au-
dio). We propose FastZIP , a novel ZIP scheme that significantly
reduces pairing time, while providing stronger security than state-
of-the-art ZIP schemes. The main contribution of FastZIP is its
innovative design combining the Fuzzy Password-Authenticated
Key Exchange (fPAKE) protocol and sensor fusion. We implement
and empirically evaluate FastZIP in the exemplary use case of intra-
car device pairing, demonstrating that FastZIP (1) reliably pairs
devices inside the same car, achieving up to three times faster pair-
ing than state-of-the-art ZIP schemes, (2) is secure against various
attacks, and (3) runs efficiently on off-the-shelf IoT devices.
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